Right of Publicity From the Performer\u27s Point of View by Masur, Richard
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 10 
Issue 2 Spring 2000: American Association of 
Law Schools Intellectual Property Section 
Meeting 
Article 3 
Right of Publicity From the Performer's Point of View 
Richard Masur 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Masur, Right of Publicity From the Performer's Point of View, 10 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. 
L. 253 (2000) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/3 
This Lead Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of 
Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
2000 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW
SCHOOLS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SECTION MEETING
The Right of Publicity: Competing Perspectives and
Divergent Analyses
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY FROM THE
PERFORMER'S POINT OF VIEW
Richard Masur*
From an American performer's point of view, the most startling
aspect of the legal community's debate over the right of publicity
is its underlying assumption. It is generally accepted that upon
entry into the public eye by virtue of his or her creative work, the
performer subsequently relinquishes all rights that would otherwise
protect him or her. This debate centers on whether a performer's
persona is a public resource to which anyone may have free and
unfettered access. One side of the debate maintains that the First
Amendment demands this access be virtually without limit, while
the other side avers that the performer should be able to retain
some controls in limited circumstances.
Interestingly, the question posed by the performer is markedly
different. The performer asks: "At what point did I make an
agreement with the public that the way in which I earn my living
ipso facto denies me the protections which generally apply to the
rest of the population?" The simple answer is no such agreement
exists. An artist's work exposes him to direct public scrutiny.
Although it is assumed that public exposure quite naturally causes
* Richard Masur has twenty-seven years experience as a professional actor
working in film, television, radio and theater. He has also served as an officer of
the Screen Actors Guild for the past ten years-the last four years serving as the
Guild's president.
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the public to view artists and performers as public property, this
assumption is intrinsically wrong.
Actors, singers, comedians, models and sports figures come into
the public's eye by virtue of their work. Similar to all other
members of the society, the performer's work is also the means by
which the family is supported. Most performers have little or no
concept of the dramatic life changes that success will bring. All
performers start out unknown-a condition that remains constant
for the vast majority of artists. Most artists and performers never
have to deal with the attendant problems and disruptions associated
with extreme notoriety and celebrity.
As in any profession, there are those who rise to the top. Being a
performer is unique in the sense that success carries with it an
unusual measure of celebrity. Furthermore, a performer's
persona-her body, voice and face-defines her value in the
market place. The basic asset the performer possesses, that which
he depends upon to earn a living, is his own persona.
Unlike others who come into the public eye, such as politicians
and other public servants, performers are neither on the public
payroll nor have they sought and obtained the public's trust in
order to get their jobs. This is the distinction between the public
official and the far more broadly defined "public figure." Public
officials, whether elected, appointed, or hired, have indeed made
an agreement with the public to serve them and have directly and
willingly accepted the scrutiny and sense of propriety to which the
public has a right. Performers, on the other hand, have entered the
public eye without agreeing to accept public funds in exchange for
the public's trust. Performers are members of the public in exactly
the same sense as any other person in American society.
Therefore, they have every reason to expect that the rights
available to others should be equally available to them.
Such an expectation, however, is not entirely realistic. Celebrity
brings with it a certain loss of privacy that is unavoidable. How
much privacy a performer can reasonably be expected to lose is a
question for another forum. The more relevant question is whether
performers should be expected to lose the right to protect their
most valuable asset (i.e., their persona) from being misappropriated
by anyone who chooses to use it. No reasonable explanation exists
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for narrowing a performer's rights as compared to the protections
enjoyed by the rest of society.
The right of publicity was conceived as a tool by which an
individual could seek redress for the unauthorized use of his or her
persona-generally described as a person's name, likeness, voice
or signature. Rights of publicity, which exist for living persons
have long recognized that the right is an amalgam of personal
privacy and property rights. Where rights exist to cover the use of
the personas of deceased persons, the privacy element is
consistently excluded, since the dead have no legal status as
persons, and therefore no right of personal privacy. However, the
property element is retained and has been thoroughly tested.
Over twenty state jurisdictions recognize some form of right of
publicity, either through common law or statute.' Unfortunately,
great variation exists among the states that currently have some
legal coverage in place. This variation and the lack of either
common law or statutory rights in many other jurisdictions creates
a confusing "crazy-quilt effect," causing terrible uncertainty, for
those whose rights are abridged and those who may unintentionally
infringe upon them.
Professional performers do their work all over this country.
Their completed work is distributed worldwide through a number
of different media. In today's world, there is no longer any such
thing as a local broadcast or local publication. Digital recording
and reproduction can create copies that are identical in content and
quality to the original regardless of how many generations of
reproductions are made. Digital technology has dramatically
escalated the possibilities for abuse. Individual state jurisdiction
over this kind of privacy invasion and misappropriation of property
is insufficient and inexcusable given the capabilities of current
technology. A uniform federal statute is the only means possible
to protect the interests of performers and others whose personas
may be misappropriated.
The argument most often raised in objection to a federal right of
publicity statute is based upon the maintenance of the free
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 28 (4th ed. 2000
rev.).
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marketplace of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment.
Proponents of this argument claim the free marketplace of ideas
allows each individual in society access to every image, every
word and every note of music. Without this First Amendment
protection, speech will become commodified thereby increasing
the threat of censorship.
The restrictive concepts embodied in U.S. copyright and
trademark law stand in stark contrast to this position. Although it
is not possible to obtain a copyright for one's persona, the Lanham
Ace does provide recourse for misappropriation of a persona in
some specific situations. However, trademark misappropriation of
a persona presupposes that a sale is the goal of the
misappropriation. The Lanham Act does not cover instances in
which the value of the property may be diminished or diluted as a
result of the unauthorized use.'
Our system of laws governing the use of intellectual property
developed in the age of the printed word and the still photograph.
Over time, adaptations have been made to bend these laws to
accommodate recorded sounds and moving pictures. These
adaptations worked reasonably well in the era of film, vinyl and
analog electronic recording (i.e., video and audio tape). Now
however, with the advent of digital recording, reproduction and
distribution, the landscape has irrevocably changed.
These changes, in regard to copyright protections, are slowly
being recognized, domestically as well as internationally. Many
who oppose any rights for performers, have labored long and hard
to preserve their own rights as copyright holders. Performers have
consistently supported the protection of copyrights in the digital
age. Many performer contractual rights are connected to the
income derived by the copyright holders-rights pertaining to the
distribution and sale of copyrighted works.
In the digital age, however, many misappropriations can occur
that do not effect the copyright holder sufficiently to stimulate the.
taking of protective action. For example, a performer who appears
in a film, which is distributed on digital video disk ("DVD"), may
2 See generally, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1996).
3 Id.
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have his or her image stolen and put to a use that was never
intended or to which the performer never agreed. In these cases,
however, the copyrighted work itself is not damaged in the
slightest. This creates a situation in which the only party that has
the status to act (the copyright holder), lacks a reason to act, and
the party with a reason to act (the performer), does not have any
legal status. This creates a very unstable situation that needs to be
addressed.
The question then arises whether an individual has a right to
control the use of another's persona without permission, in
circumstances which would either invade personal privacy or tend
to damage, destroy, diminish or dilute the property value of that
persona. While some may say that an answer in the affirmative
damages the First Amendment and the free marketplace of ideas, I
would contend that answering any other way isolates one class of
intellectual property from protection-the personas of those who
are sufficiently recognizable so that their personas have value
worth appropriating-while allowing other forms of intellectual
property to be protected. Although a right of publicity may
provide one method of protecting the personal privacy and the
valuable property of performers, a better way may exist.
Rights of publicity have traditionally been aimed at guarding
against misappropriation for commercial purposes. The
arguments, both for and against a right of publicity have focused
on how broadly the term "commercial" should be applied.
However, the reason for the misappropriation of a persona in the
digital age may not fit neatly into the traditional "commercial"
definition.
Use of these new technologies may render serious abuses against
an individual's persona. It is widely accepted that the use of a
persona of a well-known individual in an expressive work is fully
protected under the First Amendment. But consider the following
example. It is already possible to perform a full body and face
scan of an actor, intended for use in one motion picture, and have
that scanned persona appear as a newly created performance in an
entirely different film. Since that second film would also be an
expressive work, this use would be allowed under current law. But
the damage to the actor would include not merely the income lost
20001
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as a result of not having been properly paid to appear in the second
film, it could constitute serious further damage to the actors
reputation and "good name."
Here is another hypothetical. A well-known actress appears in a
film, a clip from which is posted on the Internet for promotional
purposes. This digital clip is then downloaded, the actress' image
is copied into a program that manipulates and animates it, thereby
creating a new piece of digital fil which carries a perfect copy of
the actress' image. At this point, a new expressive work has been
created in which the actress' image appears.
Continuing with this same hypothetical situation, assume that the
new work is a screen saver, which digitally removes the actress'
clothes. Assume even further that the screen saver animates the
actress and poses her in a series of suggestive and lewd positions.
If that screen saver is then distributed and made available to others
over the Internet and no fee is charged for downloading it, no
current right of publicity would be of use to the actress in pursuing
the author of the screen saver. Furthermore, since the original
image was derived from a copyrighted work that was used to
promote the original film, under current law only the copyright
holder would be entitled to seek restitution for the
misappropriation of the material. But since there is no damage to
the copyrighted work, the copyright holder would have no interest
in pursuing the matter.
Image theft of this nature has already occurred involving still
photographs. It has caused serious damage to the reputations of
the effected performers, with little or no recourse available to them.
As technology develops, enabling more and more thefts of both
still and moving images to occur, a mechanism for curtailing this
type of abuse becomes increasingly necessary.
Can a uniform federal right of publicity address both commercial
and non-commercial uses without doing damage to the First
Amendment? Or would it be better to address these problems with
an entirely new legal approach? It is clear that a mechanism must
be put in place to protect the privacy and property rights of those
whose very notoriety has made their personas objects of substantial
intrinsic value. If not through a uniform federal right of publicity,
then some other vehicle must be found.
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